Since logical knowledge representation is commonly based on nonclassical formalisms like default logic, autoepistemic logic, or circumscription, it is necessary to perform abductive reasoning from theories of nonclassical logics. In this paper, we investigate how abduction can be performed from theories in default logic. Different modes of abduction are plausible, based on credulous and skeptical default reasoning; they appear useful for different applications such as diagnosis and planning. Moreover, we analyze the complexity of the main abductive reasoning tasks. They are intractable in the general case; we also present known classes of default theories for which abduction is tractable.
Introduction
Abductive reasoning has been recognized as an important principle of common-sense reasoning having fruitful applications in a number of areas such diverse as model-based diagnosis [Poole, 1989] , speech recognition [Hobbs et al, 1988] , maintenance of database views [Kakas and Mancarella, 1990] , and vision [Charniak and McDermott, 1985] . Until now, mainly abduction from theories of classical logic has been studied. However, logical knowledge representation is commonly based on nonclassical formalisms like default logic, autoepistemic logic, or circumscription. Thus, in such situations it is necessary to perform abductive reasoning from theories (i.e. knowledge bases) of nonclassical logics.
Since default logic is widely proposed for knowledge representation, it is important to investigate how abduction can be performed from theories (W, D) in default logic. We informally pursue this on an example.
Example 1 Consider the following set of default rules, which represent knowledge about Bill's skiing habits:
* A more elaborate version including proofs is available on email request to the authors.
f Work carried out while visiting the Christian Doppler Lab.
The defaults intuitively state the following: (i) Bill is usually not out for skiing; (ii) Bill is out for skiing on weekends, if we can assume that it is not snowing; (iii) usually it is not snowing. For the certain knowledge W = {weekend} (encoding that it is Saturday or Sunday), the default theory T -(W, D) has one extension which contains -\ snowing and skiing.Bill.
Suppose now we observe that Bill is not out for skiing (which is inconsistent with the extension). Abduction means to find an explanation for this observation, that is, to identify a set of facts, chosen from a set of hypotheses, whose presence in the theory at hand would entail the observation -skiing-Bill, i.e., cause that -skiing-Bill is in the extension. We find such an explanation by adopting the hypothesis snowing. Indeed, if we add snowing to W, the default theory T' = ({ weekend, snowing],D) has a single extension, which contains -1 skiing .Bill. We say that snowing is abduced from the observation -iskiing.Bill, or that it is an abductive explanation of -^skiing.Bill. | Observe that the description of the above situation requires the specification of some default properties that can not be represented properly in classical logic.
In general, as opposed to the example, a default theory may have several or even no extensions. For deductive entailment, this gives rise to credulous entailment, under which 7 is entailed from a default theory T (denoted iff belongs to at least one extension of T, and to skeptical entailment, under which follows from T iff belongs to all extensions of T. Accordingly, two variants of abduction from default theories arise: credulous abduction, where entailment of an observation is based on and skeptical abduction, which is based on s In practice, the user will choose credulous or skeptical abduction on the basis of the particular application domain.
We argue that credulous abduction is well suited for diagnosis, while skeptical abduction is adequate for planning. (Cf. [Poole, 1989] and [Eshghi, 1988, Ng and Mooney, 1991] for abduction in logic-based diagnosis and planning & plan recognition, respectively.) In fact, consider a system represented by a default theory (W,D) . If it receives some input, reflected by adding a set A of facts to W, then each extension of is a possible evolution of the system, i.e., each extension represents a possible reaction of the system to A.
Abductive diagnosis consists, loosely speaking, in deriving from an observed system state (characterized by the truth of a set F of facts), a suitable input A which caused this evolution (cf. [Poole, 1989] ). Now, since each extension of ) is a possible evolution of the system with input A, we can assert that A is a possible input that caused F if Thus, diagnostic problems can be naturally represented by abductive problems with credulous entailment.
Example 2 Assume there are two sky routes, rv\ and ru2, between Rome and Vienna, and three sky routes mvl, mv2, and mvZ between Milan and Vienna. Route mvl intersects route rvl, and mv2 intersects rv2. On normal speed and flight conditions, two planes from Milan and Rome to Vienna will collide if the plane from Milan takes off 20 minutes after the plane from Rome and they fly on intersecting routes. This knowledge about possible collisions is represented in simplified form by the following set D of propositional defaults:
Now, you are informed that planes flying from Milan and Rome to Vienna collided. A diagnosis for the collision can be obtained by abducing an explanation for the observation collision from the theory . In this case, we want to know possible flight schedules that can have caused the collision. In other words, we are looking for schedules S such that collision is in some extension of the theory Credulous abduction correctly identifies such explanations. For instance, it is easy to recognize that both m_20minJater} and E2 = are credulous explanations for collision.
I Suppose now we want that the system evolves into a certain state (described by a set F of facts), and we have to determine the "right" input that enforces this state of the system (planning). In this case it is not sufficient to choose an input A such that F is true in some possible evolution of the system; rather, we look for an input A such that F is true in all possible evolutions, as we want be sure that the system reacts in that particular way. In other words, we look for A such that Hence, planning activities can be represented by abductive problems with skeptical entailment.
Example 3
We know that a plane from Rome to Vienna left at 7.50 (r.7.50), but we do not know on which route. We have to schedule the flight of a plane from Milan to Vienna, where takeoff is possible at 8.10 (m.8.10) and at 8.20 (rn.8.20) . The collision-free schedules can be obtained by finding an abductive explanation out of The existence of a consistent extension for (WUE, D) (in this case, all extensions are consistent) assures that the explanation E is consistent with the knowledge represented in (W, D) . This is analogous to the consistency criterion in abduction from classical theories.
It is common in abductive reasoning to prune the set of all explanations and to focus, guided by some principle of explanation preference, on a set of preferred explanations. The most important such principle is, following Occam's principle of parsimony, to prefer nonredundant explanations, i.e., explanations which do not contain any other explanation properly, cf. [Peng and Reggia, 1990 , Selman and Levesque, 1990 , Konolige, 1992 . We refer to such explanations as minimal explanations. In Example 3 E3 = {m_8.20} and E4 = {mv3) are the minimal explanations; they represent the smallest partial schedules that can be arbitrarily completed to collision-free schedules, and thus provide the greatest flexibility.
In the sequel, we will write Exp(V) for the set of explanations for the PDAP V, abstracting from the chosen type of explanations (credulous, skeptical, minimal credulous, or minimal skeptical).
The following properties of a hypothesis in a PDAP V are important with respect to computing explanations. Now consider abduction based on skeptical reasoning. It would be useful to have a reduction of abductive reasoning to deductive reasoning which can be computed efficiently. However, by using skeptical reasoning the abductive reasoning tasks grow more complex, by one level of the polynomial hierarchy. This strongly suggests that such an efficient reduction is not possible.
We first consider the problem of recognizing skeptical solutions. Clearly, this reduces to deciding if a certain default theory has a consistent extension (which is where / is a new atom. Then, V has a skeptical explanation iff $ is valid.
How does this result compare to other nonmonotonic logics, in particular, which nonmonotonic logic has similar complexity ?
We know that Konolige's moderately grounded autoepistemic logic [Konolige, 1988] and several other ground nonmonotonic modal logics have the same complexity Gottlob, 1992, Donini et a/., 1995] ; thus, we can use a theorem prover for such logics to perform abductive reasoning from default theories based on skeptical explanations.
Minimal explanations
As mentioned above, one is usually interested in minimal explanations for observations. The results in [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995] were that the complexity of abduction from classical theories does not increase if minimal explanations are used instead of arbitrary explanations. However, this is not true in for abduction from default logic. Here, checking minimality of an explanation is a source of complexity, which causes an increase in complexity by one level of the polynomial hierarchy. Consider first credulous explanations. Checking minimality of an explanation E has complementary complexity of checking the explanation property. Notice that E is not minimal iff for some h E, the PDAP , M, W, D) has a credulous solution; hence, it follows that the problem is in '. _ . On the other hand, reconsider (***). Clearly, {h} is a credulous explanation; moreover, it is minimal iff h is necessary for V. Thus, Ilf-hardness follows.
Note that recognizing minimal credulous explanations, which consists in checking the solution property and testing minimality, is in , and also complete for this class.
Thus, this problem can be transformed into recognition of skeptical explanations for a certain PDAP and vice versa. Due to the complexity of minimality checking, problem Relevance migrates to the next level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Theorem 4 Let V be a PDAP based on minimal credulous explanations.
Then, problem Relevance is complete, with hardness holding even for normal P. Proof. (Sketch) Membership. A guess E for a minimal credulous explanation for V such that h E can be verified by two calls to a oracle. Hence, the problem is in one can show that s is relevant tor a minimal credulous explanation for V iff -is valid. I Now let us consider minimal skeptical explanations. Testing minimality of a skeptical explanation is much more involved than of a credulous explanation. While the latter has roughly the same complexity as testing the explanation property, the former is harder by one level of the polynomial hierarchy. Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. Since verifying a credulous explanation E is in , it has a polynomial-size "proof" which can be checked with an NP oracle in polynomial time. Thus, if we ask for a smaller explanation E' E, we can simultaneously guess E' and its proof, and check the proof in polynomial time with the NP oracle. However, verifying a skeptical explanation -hard, and hence E does not have such a "proof". Here, verification needs the full power of a oracle.
Theorem 5 Let V = (H,M,W,D) be a PDAP. Deciding if a skeptical explanation E for V is minimal is
-complete, with hardness holding even for normal V. Proof.
(Sketch) Membership. A guess for a smaller skeptical explanation E' E can be verified with two calls to i oracle, and hence deciding the existence of such an E' is in . Consequently, the problem is in
nf-
Hardness. We describe here a reduction from deciding whether a is valid. Let s and q be new atoms, and define Check that is a skeptical explanation for V. Moreover, E is minimal iff $ is valid. | Note that recognizing minimal skeptical explanations is in , since the complexity of deciding minimality I dominates the complexity of the solution property ("only"
, and is also complete for this class. The complexity of deciding relevance of a hypothesis increases by the same amount as testing minimality if skeptical explanations are used instead of credulous explanations. In fact, the problem resides at the fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. There is no well-known nonmonotonic logic that has similar complexity, and thus one can not take advantage of theorem provers for such logics to perform skeptical abduction from default theories.
Tractable cases
From the practical side, the results from above are discouraging, since abduction from default theories has even higher complexity than deduction, in particular for skeptical explanations. The reasoning tasks suffer from several intermingled sources of complexity, whose number is (at least) the level at the polynomial hierarchy. For example, Relevance for V -(H,M,W,D) using minimal skeptical explanations (complete for suffers from the following four "orthogonal" sources of complexity: (1.) classical deductive inference the number of extensions of (3.) the number of candidates E for a skeptical explanation, and (4.) the number of possible smaller explanations, where each number can be exponential.
For dealing with abduction from default theories in practice, we have to find tractable cases or cases where g ood algorithms for handling hard problems like GSAT Selman et a/., 1992] are applicable.
An example of the latter case is credulous abduction from default theories where all propositional formulas Consequently, also Relevance for minimal explanations is polynomial if M is small.
Conclusion and further research
We proposed a basic model of abduction from default theories, and analyzed its computational complexity. Moreover, we have shown that credulous abduction from the previously known classes of Literal-Horn and Krompf-normal default theories is tractable.
Besides identifying further tractable and manageable cases of default abduction, the following issues are currently under investigation.
The size of an explanation (cf. [Peng and Reggia, 1990] ) or, more general, its cost, given by the sum of the predefined costs of its hypotheses, can be used for further pruning minimal (i.e., nonredundant) explanations. Results for abduction from classical theories [Eiter and Gottlob, 1995] suggest using such explanations, abduction from default theories yields complete problems for the classesof the polynomial hierarchy.
Another issue is default logic with an underlying language richer than a plain propositional one. A generalization of our abduction model to a propositional language over atoms p(t 1 ,... ,t n ) where the t{ are variables or constants, is straightforward; here, an instance of an abduction problem reduces to the propositional abduction problem obtained by replacing formulas with all ground instances. Since the grounded propositional version can be exponentially larger, this leads intuitively to an exponential increase in complexity. Thus, abduction from default theories in this nonground language is expected to be complete for the exponential analogues of
